

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03210 131227Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13 OMB-01 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 AID-05
EB-08 AF-10 SSM-03 ARA-06 /121 W
-----131234Z 053453 /17

R 131125Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2046
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3210

E.O.11652: XGDS-1 (DECONTROL 1995)
TAGS: PFOR, IR, IZ, XF
SUBJ: IRANIAN VIEW OF IRAQ AND GULF RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. IN WIDE-RANGING TOUR D'HORIZON HIGH MFA OFFICIAL
SPOKE OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE BEING ATTACHED TO FORTHCOMING IRAQI
TOUR OF GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS KUWAIT. HE TOOK
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF KUWAITI ARMS PURCHASE FROM SOVIETS,
SUGGESTING IT HAD ITS GOOD POINTS AS WELL AS THE BAD AND NOTED
THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSULTATION WITH IRAN ON THE QUESTION. HE
OUTLINED VIEW OF IRAN'S STRENGTH AS DESIRABLE BOTH TO SAUDIS
FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PROTECTING FREE PASSAGE THROUGH HORMUZ
STRAIT AS WELL AS TO SMALLER GULF STATES FROM POINT OF VIEW OF
BALANCING POSSIBLE SAUDI EXPANSIONISM. HE TREATED US TO
A MINI LECTURE ON THE FOLLY OF UNILATERALLY REFUSING ARMS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 03210 131227Z

SALES TO AREA CUSTOMERS WHO ARE PREPARED TO PAY BUT AGREED
THIS WOULD BE AN EXEMPLARY STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT SHOULD
WE BE ABLE TO GET THE SOVIETS ALSO TO RESTRAIN CONVENTION-
AL ARMS SALES--SOMETHING HE THOUGHT VERY DIFFICULT TO DO.
END SUMMARY.

2. DURING CALL ON HIM BY VISITING AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI

AND ADCM APRIL 12, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ASIA AND AFRICA NAYERI NOTED IRANIANS ATTACH SOME IMPORTANCE TO FORTHCOMING IRAQI MISSION TO THE GULF WHICH WILL BE LED BY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, WHO IS VERY IMPORTANT IN BAATH PARTY. HE IS EXPECTED TO VISIT KUWAIT AND, IRANIANS THINK, OMAN, IN ADDITION TO OTHER STOPS (QATAR, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI). HIS MISSION WILL BE TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON IRAQI PROPOSITION THAT GULF SECURITY SHOULD BE HANDLED BILATERALLY RATHER THAN COLLECTIVELY AS IRANIANS WANT. SPECULATING FURTHER, NAYERI THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT IRAQIS MIGHT AGREE TO PUT THEIR CURRENT BORDER SQUABBLE WITH KUWAIT ON ICE. HE PREDICATED THIS ON VARIETY OF PRESSURES AND TROUBLES BESIEGING IRAQI REGIME AS WELL AS, ON THE OTHER HAND, RELATIVELY GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN WHICH PERMIT IRAQ TO WORRY LESS ABOUT SECURITY OF ACCESS TO THE GULF AND THEREFORE LESS ABOUT THE ISLANDS OF BUBAYAN AND WARBAH.

3. NAYERI ADDED THAT RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE PROCEEDING QUITE FAVORABLY FROM IRANIAN POINT OF VIEW. HE EXPRESSED THE THEORY IRANIAN-IRAQI RAPPROACHMENT HAD LOWERED THE TEMPERATURE THROUGHOUT THE GULF, EVEN AFFECTING ADEN REGIME, WHICH HAS TAKEN A POLICY TACK MORE FAVORABLE TO THE WEST SINCE. HIS PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT ADENIS ARE OUT TO GET WHAT THEY CAN FROM ALL COMERS. THEY WERE NOT ABOUT TO BE IN THE SOVIET POCKET, NOR ARE THEY PARTICULARLY SINCERE IN THEIR CURRENT HONEYMOON WITH THE SAUDIS. THEY WANT WHAT GOODIES THEY CAN GET BUT REMAIN UNCHANGED BENEATH THE SURFACE. MORE BROADLY, NAYERI SUGGESTED FOR SAKE OF ARGUMENT THE SCENARIO IN WHICH A RADICAL REGIME

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 03210 131227Z

SOMEHOW GOT CONTROL OF OMAN GOVERNMENT. IRANIAN STRENGTH AND POLICY IS AIMED AT MAKING SURE SUCH A REGIME WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH TRANSIT THROUGH STRAIT OF HORMUZ. WITH ITS STRENGTH IRAN COULD BE REASONABLY CONFIDENT IT WOULD REACH A MODUS VIVENDI WITH ANY SUCH REGIME. BUT COULD THE SAME BE SAID OF THE SAUDIS? HE THOUGHT THE SAUDIS WERE MORE EXPOSED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND OUGHT TO REALIZE IT.

4. NAYERI LAMENTED THE AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE OF SAUDIS AND OTHER GULF STATES TOWARD IRANIANS' STRENGTH. ON ONE HAND SAUDIS APPROVED OF IRANIAN HELP TO OMAN IN PUTTING DOWN DHOFAR REBELLION WHILE ON THE OTHER WISHING SAUDIS THEMSELVES OR SOME OTHER ARAB COUNTRY COULD HAVE GIVEN THIS ASSISTANCE INSTEAD OF IRAN. BY SAME TOKEN SMALL GULF STATES SUCH AS QATAR SOMETIMES EXPRESS FEAR OF IRAN BUT ARE ALSO HAPPY IRAN IS THERE AS A CHECK TO POSSIBLE SAUDI AMBITIONS. IN FACT, HE SAID, SMALL GULF STATES HAVE MORE CAUSE TO FEAR SAUDI EXPANSIONISM IN THE LONG RUN THAN

IRANIAN. THEY KNOW IRANIANS ARE A DIFFERENT PEOPLE WHO HAVE GONE ON RECORD AS DESIRING NO MORE TERRITORY. SAUDIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, GREATLY OVERSHADOW SMALL GULF STATES IN POPULATION AND TERRITORY AND ARE ARABS THEMSELVES, WHO MIGHT MORE EASILY DIGEST THEIR SMALL NEIGHBORS.

5. WHEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS OF CURRENT KUWAITI ARMS PURCHASE FROM SOVIET UNION, NAYERI SAID IRAN WOULD OF COURSE HAVE PREFERRED THIS NOT TAKE PLACE, SINCE IT INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE AREA. ONCE KUWAITIS DECIDED ON IT, HOWEVER, IRANIAN VIEW IS THAT PERHAPS THE MOVE IS NOT ALL BAD. KUWAITIS CLEARLY HOPE TO INTEREST SOVIETS IN KUWAIT'S FATE AND GARNER SOME POLITICAL SUPPORT AGAINST IRAQI ENCROACHMENTS. FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW, NAYERI THOUGHT IT DOES NOTHING TO FOSTER CLOSENESS OF IRAQ-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN ANY CASE, IRANIANS BELIEVE IRAQIS DESIRE TO PUT MORE AIR BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 03210 131227Z

SOVIETS THESE DAYS.

6. NAYERI SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED THAT NEITHER KUWAITIS NOR IRAQIS HAVE CONSULTED WITH IRAN ON KUWAITI ARMS PURCHASE. WHILE KUWAIT FIGURES IN NORMAL TOURS D'HORIZON WHICH TAKE PLACE WHEN IRANIAN AND IRAQI OFFICIALS MEET, HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS NO REAL CONSULTATION OR NEGOTIATION ON KUWAIT'S FATE. HE CONTRASTED THIS TO AN HISTORICAL NOTE, NAMELY HIS BELIEF THAT IT WAS IRAN WHICH PREVENTED IRAQI TAKEOVER OF KUWAIT IN CRISIS OF 1961 WHEN ANNOUNCED BRITISH SUPPORT FOR KUWAIT WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE (COMMENT: SIC).

7. FINALLY, NAYERI LAUNCHED INTO A SHORT LECTURE ON LACK OF WISDOM IN UNILATERAL US REFUSALS TO SELL ARMS TO AREA CUSTOMERS WHO WISHED TO BE FRIENDS OF US. THEY SIMPLY TURN TO OTHER SUPPLIERS AND IN CASES WHERE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO REFUSE PROVIDE THEM, DUE PERHAPS TO US INFLUENCE, THEY TURN TO SOVIETS. NAYERI SAID HE WAS NOT REFERRING TO KUWAITI CASE IN PARTICULAR, BUT WAS SPEAKING GENERALLY (COMMENT: WITH OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF PUSHING ONE OF THE TOP CONCERNS OF GOI VIZ-A-VIZ CURRENT USG POLICY REVIEW). NAYERI READILY ADMITTED THAT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS SUPPLY WOULD BE GREAT ACHIEVEMENT, BUT IT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO GET SINCE IT WOULD REQUIRE LARGE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY AND EVEN TO SOME DEGREE SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND TACTICS. HE NOTED SOVIETS HAVE TRADITIONALLY USED ARMS SALES AS LEVERS TO GAIN ENTRY, IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH HE MENTIONED CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA.

MIKLOS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 13-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977TEHRAN03210
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1 (DECONTROL 1995)
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770128-0112
Format: TEL
From: TEHRAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770460/aaaabzvq.tel
Line Count: 169
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ee45b2a5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2816124
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IRANIAN VIEW OF IRAQ AND GULF RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, IR, IZ, XF
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ee45b2a5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009